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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Poems and books get written, songs sung, and movies 
made about sinking ships.1  But there’s nothing stirring or awe-
inspiring about a yacht that partially sinks in calm waters while 
docked.  That, sadly, is the event at the center of this case.  In 
the insurance dispute that followed, the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the insurance company because 
the yacht’s owners, Mr. and Mrs. Inganamort, did not carry 
their burden of proving that the loss was a matter of chance – 
 
1 See, e.g., Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Wreck of 
the Hesperus, in Ballads and Other Poems (John Owen ed., 
1842); Gordon Lightfoot, The Wreck of the Edmund 
Fitzgerald, on Summertime Dream (Reprise Records 1976); 
Sebastian Junger, The Perfect Storm (1997); The Perfect Storm 
(Warner Bros. 2000). 
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“fortuitous,” in the argot of insurance – which is a requirement 
for coverage under the all-risk insurance policy the 
Inganamorts had.  Because we agree that an insured bears the 
burden of proving fortuity, and that the Inganamorts did not 
meet that burden here, we will affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 John and Joan Inganamort left their 65-foot fishing 
vessel, Three Times a Lady, docked behind their part-time 
residence in Boca Raton, Florida.  In September 2011, when 
they were at their home in New Jersey, the Inganamorts 
received the sad news that Three Times a Lady had come to the 
end of her rainbow,2 sinking enough to sustain serious damage.  
They reported the loss to their insurance company, Chartis 
Property Casualty Company, with whom they had an all-risk 
policy.3  Chartis sent a claims specialist to conduct a 
preliminary survey of the vessel on October 24, 2011.  The 
specialist reported three inches of standing water in the 
starboard forward cabin bilge and multiple potential sources of 
 
2 Hat tip to Lionel Richie, The Commodores, Three 
Times a Lady, on Natural High (Motown Records 1978). 
 
3 An all-risk insurance policy is one “that covers every 
kind of insurable loss except what is specifically excluded.”  
Insurance, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  In marine 
insurance, all-risk policies are “construed as covering all losses 
that are ‘fortuitous.’”  Goodman v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 
600 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Ingersoll Milling 
Mach. Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 307 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(“All risk coverage covers all losses which are fortuitous ….”). 
 
4 
 
water ingress, including a hole in the hull the size of a screw.  
He also found that the electrical breakers were “severely rust-
stained and blackened from an electrical failure[,]” and 
subsequent testing “revealed obvious water intrusion[.]”  (App. 
at 171.)  The final review of the vessel, completed June 28, 
2012, confirmed the claim specialist’s initial findings and also 
identified that the ship’s battery charger was not working, and 
without a source of power, the ship’s bilge pumps had ceased 
functioning.  Despite that state of disrepair, the Inganamorts 
pressed Chartis for payment on their insurance policy. 
 
 To settle the question of coverage, Chartis filed a 
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey, setting forth three counts: a plea for declaratory 
judgment that Chartis was not liable for the damage to Three 
Times a Lady, a claim that the Inganamorts were liable for 
material misrepresentations and rescission of contract, and a 
reservation of rights to assert additional grounds for 
declaratory judgment, misrepresentation and rescission.  No 
one disputes that an insurance policy was in place at the time 
of the loss, so the question was, and remains, whether the 
vessel’s partial submersion was a loss of the kind covered by 
an all-risk policy, specifically, whether it was a fortuitous loss.   
 
After prolonged discovery, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  The District Court’s Local 
Rule 56.1 requires parties to file a statement of undisputed facts 
with a motion for summary judgment, and it also requires 
parties responding to a motion for summary judgment to 
respond to the moving party’s Rule 56.1 Statement.  In the 
absence of a response, the local rules declare that the facts in 
the movant’s Rule 56.1 Statement will be deemed undisputed.  
Chartis sought summary judgment only on its declaratory 
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judgment claim, while the Inganamorts did not specify which 
of the counts in Chartis’s complaint they thought warranted 
summary judgment in their favor.  They neither filed a 
statement of undisputed facts nor opposed Chartis’s statement 
of undisputed facts.  The District Court thus treated Chartis’s 
statement of facts as being undisputed.  In further consequence, 
the Court granted summary judgment for Chartis because the 
Inganamorts “ha[d] no evidence to demonstrate a fortuitous 
loss[.]”  (App. at 19.)   
 
The Inganamorts have timely appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION4 
 
 We address a simple question of federal maritime law: 
Who bears the burden of proving a fortuitous loss?  Every 
circuit to decide the issue has determined that the insured bears 
that burden, and we agree.  The Inganamorts did not carry it, 
so we will affirm the decision of the District Court.5 
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the 
same standard the district court applied.  Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  Under 
that standard, we will affirm a grant of summary judgment only 
if there is no dispute as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
 
5 Chartis also argued in its Answering Brief that, if we 
were to decide that the Inganamorts did carry their burden of 
proving the loss was fortuitous, we should still affirm because 
several exceptions to coverage apply.  Since we conclude that 
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 As already noted, when Three Times a Lady sank, it was 
covered by an all-risk insurance policy, which protects against 
fortuitous losses, meaning losses that are unexplainable or 
“dependent on chance.”  Intermetal Mexicana, S.A. v. Ins. Co. 
of N. Am., 866 F.2d 71, 77 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).  
All-risk policies “arose for the very purpose of protecting the 
insured in those cases where difficulties of logical explanation 
or some mystery surround the (loss of or damage to) property.”  
Morrison Grain Co., Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424, 
430 (5th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).  But just because an 
insured need not “show the precise cause of loss to demonstrate 
fortuity[,]” id. at 430, that does not mean an all-risk policy 
covers all damage.6  “‘All-risk’ is not synonymous with ‘all 
 
the Inganamorts did not carry the burden of proving fortuitous 
loss, we need not address those exceptions. 
 
6 The Inganamorts have misread Morrison Grain to 
mean that an insured need only show that a loss occurred while 
the policy was in effect.  But that case did not dispense with 
the insured’s burden to establish fortuity; rather, it concluded 
the insured had impliedly met that burden by demonstrating the 
ship’s cargo was in “good condition when the policy attached 
and in damaged condition when unloaded from the vessel,” id. 
at 432, leaving “no indication” that the loss was caused by 
“anything but fortuitous circumstances.”  Id. at 430.  Likewise, 
where cargo has simply disappeared without explanation from 
ships’ hulls, courts have sometimes observed that all the 
“insured need show is that the loss occurred.”  See, e.g., 
Atlantic Lines Ltd. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 
11, 13 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Balogh v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 
167 F. Supp. 763, 769 (S.D. Fla. 1958), aff’d, 272 F.2d 889 
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loss.’”  Intermetal Mexicana, 866 F.2d at 75.  Despite the 
Inganamorts’ argument, an insured must do more than prove 
that there was a loss.  To enjoy coverage, the insured must 
prove that the loss was indeed fortuitous. 
 
The First, Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have all 
held that, for marine insurance policies, the insured bears the 
burden of proving that the loss was fortuitous.  See Banco 
Nacional de Nicaragua v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 681 F.2d 1337, 
1340 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The [insured] in a suit under an all-
risks insurance policy must show a relevant loss in order to 
invoke the policy, and proof that the loss occurred within the 
policy period is part and parcel of that showing of a loss.”); 
Morrison Grain, 632 F.2d at 429 (“[T]he burden of proof 
generally is upon the insured to show that a loss arose from a 
covered peril.”); Atlantic Lines Ltd. V. American Motorists Ins. 
Co., 547 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[F]or recovery under an 
all risks policy, an insured need demonstrate only that a 
fortuitous loss has occurred.”); Boston Ins. Co. v. Dehydrating 
Process Co., 204 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1953) (“Undoubtedly 
… the owner of the barge and its cargo has the burden of 
establishing … that its loss was caused by a risk insured 
against[.]”).  In the non-maritime context, we too have held that 
an insured with an all-risk policy bears the burden of proving 
that a loss was fortuitous and therefore covered by the policy.  
See Intermetal Mexicana, 866 F.2d at 76-77 (describing what 
the insurer showed to prove the event was fortuitous).  We now 
 
(5th Cir. 1959)).  Again, however, where the record reflected 
the cargo was previously present, those observations merely 
reflect that it is unlikely “the average insured would not equate 
a mysterious disappearance with a fortuitous loss” in those 
circumstances.  Id.   
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join our sister circuits in saying that, under a maritime all-risk 
policy, the insured bears the burden of proving that a loss was 
fortuitous.   
 
That burden is not heavy, but it is more than negligible.  
See id. at 77 (“[T]he ‘burden of demonstrating fortuity is not a 
particularly onerous one[.]’” (quoting Morrison Grain, 632 
F.2d at 430)); see also PECO Energy Co. v. Boden, 64 F.3d 
852, 858 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Proving fortuity is not particularly 
difficult.”).  Since the nature of a fortuitous loss is that it may 
not be easily explained, the insured need not point to an exact 
cause of the loss.  In re Balfour, 85 F.3d at 77 (“The insured … 
need not prove the cause of the loss.”); Morrison Grain, 632 
F.2d at 431 (“[C]ourts which have considered the question 
have rejected the notion that the insured must show the precise 
cause of loss to demonstrate fortuity.”).  When a vessel sinks 
in calm waters, for example, an insured may create a 
presumption of fortuitous loss by establishing that the vessel 
was seaworthy before sinking.  See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Lanasa 
Shrimp Co., 726 F.2d 688, 690 (11th Cir. 1984); Reisman v. 
New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 312 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1963); 
Boston Ins. Co., 204 F.2d at 443.  There must, in short, be some 
showing that the loss occurred by chance. 
 
Here, the Inganamorts’ primary argument was that they 
were not required to prove fortuity, which, as the weight of 
authority just cited proves, is incorrect as a matter of law.7  
 
7 Counsel for the Inganamorts eventually admitted as 
much at oral argument.  See Oral Argument at 1:26-1:44, 
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/19-
1903ChartisPropertyCasualtyCov.Inganamortetal.mp3. 
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Secondarily, they attempted to show fortuity by asserting that 
the loss was due to heavy rainfall.  But Chartis’s statement of 
undisputed facts notes that there is “no data to support [the] 
theory that [Three Times a Lady] was subject to ‘heavy rains’ 
on any date.”  (App. at 172.)  Even if we were tempted to look 
beyond the statement of undisputed facts, the evidence 
elsewhere in the record does not support the assertion that the 
loss was due to heavy rainfall.  Not even the Inganamorts’ own 
expert could say with assurance that there was heavy rainfall 
in the area at the relevant time.8  Finally, while the Inganamorts 
had initially claimed that the ship was seaworthy prior to 
September 15th, they made no effort to present renewed 
evidence of seaworthiness after the loss was backdated to 
September 5th or 6th; nor did they press this argument before 
the District Court or on appeal.  Because there is nothing in the 
record to support the argument that the loss was due to heavy 
rainfall and there is no other indication of fortuity, the 
Inganamorts did not carry their burden of proving a fortuitous 
loss.9 
 
8 The expert said that “[i]t had been reported in 
September [2011] that two (2) or possibl[y] three (3 coastal) 
events of heavy rains, lightning, and heavy thunderstorms did 
drench South Florida with 5” to up to 15” of rain.”  (App. at 
217.)  But he later backpedaled, saying he had looked at rainfall 
for September 15th, the day the loss was reported, not 
September 5th or 6th, the revised date of loss, and that, “you 
know, weather records are extremely difficult to determine the 
exact flow …[.]”  (App. at 204.)   
 
9 At oral argument, there was some discussion about 
whether a loss resulting from negligent behavior, or 
negligently failing to maintain a vessel, would qualify as a 
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fortuitous loss.  See Oral Argument at 20:25-27:32 
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/19-
1903ChartisPropertyCasualtyCov.Inganamortetal.mp3.  
Losses that result from negligent behavior can be considered 
fortuitous, but losses caused by wear and tear typically cannot.  
See Goodman, 600 F.2d at 1042 (“A loss is not considered 
fortuitous if it results … from ordinary wear and tear ….  
However, loss due to the negligence of the insured or his agents 
has generally been held to be fortuitous and, absent express 
exclusion, is covered by an all risks policy.”); see also Youell 
v. Exxon Corp., 48 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The fortuity 
rule excludes from coverage losses that arise from … wear and 
tear …; losses that arise from … the insured’s negligence[ ] are 
covered.” (vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 801 (1995)).  
We question the suggestion that a loss caused by negligently 
allowing a vessel to fall into disrepair would be considered 
fortuitous, as it would seem to create perverse incentives if 
damage resulting from failure to maintain a vessel were 
considered as such.  Indeed, this would effectively convert all-
risk insurance policies into general maintenance contracts or 
“warrant[ies] of soundness,” leaving the insurer liable for all 
maintenance costs except for those expressly excluded.  Mellon 
v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F.2d 997, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).  For 
that reason, courts that have taken that tack and expanded 
fortuity to include losses caused by the premature failure of a 
ship’s mechanical components have been criticized.  See 
Michael I. Goldman, The Fortuity Rule of Federal Maritime 
Law: The Scope of “All Risk” Coverage Under Policies of 
Marine Insurance and the New Decision of the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, 46 J. Maritime L. & Com. 171 
(2015).  Expanding fortuity to include losses caused by 
negligently allowing a vessel to fall into disrepair would appear 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
The Inganamorts having failed to carry their burden of 
proof, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment against them. 
 
equally ill-advised.  But because neither party raised the issue 
in briefing nor addressed it more than in passing at argument, 
we do not need to decide the question.    
